Every right is exclusive: it aims to exclude all others from commanding that over what the right is invested.
A right is only meaningful when there are means, available (included being to the knowledge of) to the right owner, to successfully defend it against any other attempt to violate it.
A rules structure is any list of all not conflicting rights.
Conflict comes from the confronting of two or more different rules structures.
Conflict is a case of absence of cooperation (the only other case of absence of cooperation being autarky).
The set of actions, either by one agents or by more, aimed to defend a rules structure, i. .e. to attack any other rules structure, conforms a government.
A government is, by definition, in conflict (i. e. in war) with any other government.
Two apparent governments which are in no conflict whatsoever, i. e. which defend the same rules structure, are not two governments but two parts of one same government.
One apparent same government which changes a rules structure, i. e. which enters into conflict with a previously defended rules structure at least in some part, it is not the same government than before but other government, therefore an enemy of the former, even if it is composed by the same people, and governs in the same place than the former. A change in the rules structure is, in kind and regardless of magnitude, akin to a coup d'état.
The apparent "meta-right" of having the right to change other rights amounts to the effective non-existence of those other rights. As long as some have the effective power to change others' rights, the others don't have rights but only the some.
Showing posts with label right. Show all posts
Showing posts with label right. Show all posts
Wednesday, December 19, 2012
Sunday, June 24, 2012
Externality = violation of a property right = coercion = the opposite of freedom = anchor to underdevelopment
I mean, if somebody is smoking in the park and I'm reading there and I don't like the smoke, such as Coase shows, the externality is not merely a matter of the smoker causing a damage to me (Pigou's naïveté). Damage is not a sufficient condition to have a (negative) externality. If and only if a violation of a property right occurs, have we an externality. The other way of seeing an externality, i. e. the need to internalize, consists precisely in the need to put a stop to such a violation of the property right, to such a coercion. Externalities can be defined only in the context of a register of property rights, since they are precisely violations to such a register. On the other hand, even in a completely internalized society where there would be no externalities at all, we could have damages and benefits perceived by some agents by the actions of other agents. The feature of those damages and benefits, however, would be so, in such a system, that our damaged or benefited agents would no have any right whatsoever over putting a stop to the damages or continue enjoying the benefits happening by the actions of other agents, which we re are assuming to be the proprietors of the things causing damages and profits to other agents in our example.
And linking the concept of coercion to the work of Friedrich Hayek in his "The Constitution of Liberty", in which he defines freedom as "that condition of men in which coercion of some by others is reduced as much as is possible in society" (page 11). This is, freedom is the absence of coercion. Coercion is the opposite of freedom. Whereas there is freedom there's no coercion, whereas there's coercion there's not freedom.
This is important, for instance, to understand the key feature by which we can tell a society in which the development advances at a reasonable pace from one in which that reasonable pace is not present. Anyone who has lived in an underdeveloped (*) country bears witness that externalities are a key feature of those countries either because a property register existing it is violated (corruption, blackmail, theft, and a regrettable etcetera) or because there is not such a register in the first place (on which the work by Hernando de Soto is particularly illustrative).
(*) In order to emphasize backwardness, but euphemistically called sometimes "developing" as if full stagnation would be possible and as trying to convey basically the opposite idea of what really happens in countries composed of mostly poor people under world standards, i. e. almost absence of a developing pace.
And linking the concept of coercion to the work of Friedrich Hayek in his "The Constitution of Liberty", in which he defines freedom as "that condition of men in which coercion of some by others is reduced as much as is possible in society" (page 11). This is, freedom is the absence of coercion. Coercion is the opposite of freedom. Whereas there is freedom there's no coercion, whereas there's coercion there's not freedom.
This is important, for instance, to understand the key feature by which we can tell a society in which the development advances at a reasonable pace from one in which that reasonable pace is not present. Anyone who has lived in an underdeveloped (*) country bears witness that externalities are a key feature of those countries either because a property register existing it is violated (corruption, blackmail, theft, and a regrettable etcetera) or because there is not such a register in the first place (on which the work by Hernando de Soto is particularly illustrative).
(*) In order to emphasize backwardness, but euphemistically called sometimes "developing" as if full stagnation would be possible and as trying to convey basically the opposite idea of what really happens in countries composed of mostly poor people under world standards, i. e. almost absence of a developing pace.
Sunday, April 8, 2012
Protectionism and Krugman
Imagine you begin to sell some good you produce. People buy a lot of product. You just can't cope with so much demand. You invest an important share of your wealth in a very specific machine only useful for manufacture the good you sell. You invest because you expect demand for your good to continue growing. But once you have made the investment, that by the way nobody commanded you to make, you realize that people are beginning to buy from a foreign firm which is selling cheaper than you can, even after the investment of your machine. Yes, you get hurt. But you get hurt because the expectations you built disappointed you, not because the owners of that foreign firm are violating any right you were previously entitled to on the budgets of the potential buyers of your good. However, if in order to avoid competition by the foreign competition you coerce either buyers or other sellers or both so that they cannot make transactions among themselves, it is you the violator. Aren't you?
It is tragicomic to me when noble Krugman et al, in their "International Economics", 9/e, page 51 et seq., say some people get hurt because of trade. Yes, they get hurt, but they get hurt as I get hurt when somebody informs me that my plan to travel to your farm on next Saturday accompanied by Angela Lansbury and by Mr. Obama in order to enjoy a Jim Carrey's play with live music by the original Sepultura's lineup is not going to be possible. It is just a correction on my expectations, precisely the damn thing which markets do, so that we can keep as coordinated as possible in a world sometimes less than ideal.
But if the situation is explained so that it looks that I got hurt because somebody else's "fault", consequently implying a violation of a right of mine (to fullfill my expectations even at expense of violating a true right of others), I guess the analysis is not the best, to say the least.
Not everybody wins with trade? Some people get hurt with trade? In the devious sense setted out by Krugman et al... Well, dah! Because, yes, according to my plan I get hurt when cruel Mr. Obama prefers to be in political meetings than to enjoy Max Cavalera's twist and shout, but this is very different than violating a presumed right of mine. You cannot avoid feeling some hideous taste to deception in Krugman exposure.
And this is what our children are learning in their international trade courses. So primitive a stage, we still are in.
It is tragicomic to me when noble Krugman et al, in their "International Economics", 9/e, page 51 et seq., say some people get hurt because of trade. Yes, they get hurt, but they get hurt as I get hurt when somebody informs me that my plan to travel to your farm on next Saturday accompanied by Angela Lansbury and by Mr. Obama in order to enjoy a Jim Carrey's play with live music by the original Sepultura's lineup is not going to be possible. It is just a correction on my expectations, precisely the damn thing which markets do, so that we can keep as coordinated as possible in a world sometimes less than ideal.
But if the situation is explained so that it looks that I got hurt because somebody else's "fault", consequently implying a violation of a right of mine (to fullfill my expectations even at expense of violating a true right of others), I guess the analysis is not the best, to say the least.
Not everybody wins with trade? Some people get hurt with trade? In the devious sense setted out by Krugman et al... Well, dah! Because, yes, according to my plan I get hurt when cruel Mr. Obama prefers to be in political meetings than to enjoy Max Cavalera's twist and shout, but this is very different than violating a presumed right of mine. You cannot avoid feeling some hideous taste to deception in Krugman exposure.
And this is what our children are learning in their international trade courses. So primitive a stage, we still are in.
Wednesday, January 20, 2010
Just to be clear
One thing is the moral obligation to help the needed. This is on what Christian love for others is based on.
Other thing is the right to demand the help of others. This is on what the State usually is based on.
On the one hand, the Christian teaching compels to help others, but doesn't promote any right to demand the help of others. Quite on the contrary, from its very origin, Christianity instructs to stoically put up with in facing need, without even trying to resort to others help, not to speak of doing it by force.
On the other hand, according to Bastiat, the State is a fiction through which everybody endeavors to live at the expense of everybody else. Government is usually the means through which majorities organize themselves in order to abuse from minorities.
Other thing is the right to demand the help of others. This is on what the State usually is based on.
On the one hand, the Christian teaching compels to help others, but doesn't promote any right to demand the help of others. Quite on the contrary, from its very origin, Christianity instructs to stoically put up with in facing need, without even trying to resort to others help, not to speak of doing it by force.
On the other hand, according to Bastiat, the State is a fiction through which everybody endeavors to live at the expense of everybody else. Government is usually the means through which majorities organize themselves in order to abuse from minorities.
Monday, August 17, 2009
Exchange value
Exchange value on a right, the importance of what I can get by handing over the property on such a right, is the one social link which can keep peace among selfish people. (The only other social link is love: the disposition to undertake human actions just for the sake of contributing to the happiness of the other.)
Exchange value can be improved by others making better offers. This is how the efforts by others to improve their productivity benefits me.
Exchange value can be improved by others making better offers. This is how the efforts by others to improve their productivity benefits me.
Monday, July 20, 2009
Worker and employer: two strong parties
Frequently, the relation between worker and employer is seen as that of a weak party (the worker, of course) facing a strong one (the abusive employer).
In many cases, this is a very misleading picture. Indeed, a more accurate way of describing the relative power of these parties is that of a strong one (the employer) facing an as well strong one (the worker who can dismiss his employer as a new opportunity appears).
The best way of protecting an employer is allowing free competition among firms, a very important part of which is competition for employees.
When the worker is devoid of his power by erecting barriers to entry of competition, then you do have a weak party facing a strong one. This way, abuse turns unavoidable. Passing legislation to supposedly protect the artificially weakened party, too often results in no more than smuggling abuse.
The first battlefront for unions truly moved by the interest of the worker should be tearing down barriers to entry of competition. Owners of firms privileged by protectionism can well lose a substantial portion of profits due to this, but industrious workers have nothing to lose but their chains.
And bear in mind that to expect from an employer unleashed from competition to remain kind to the worker is naivety, pure and huge.
In many cases, this is a very misleading picture. Indeed, a more accurate way of describing the relative power of these parties is that of a strong one (the employer) facing an as well strong one (the worker who can dismiss his employer as a new opportunity appears).
The best way of protecting an employer is allowing free competition among firms, a very important part of which is competition for employees.
When the worker is devoid of his power by erecting barriers to entry of competition, then you do have a weak party facing a strong one. This way, abuse turns unavoidable. Passing legislation to supposedly protect the artificially weakened party, too often results in no more than smuggling abuse.
The first battlefront for unions truly moved by the interest of the worker should be tearing down barriers to entry of competition. Owners of firms privileged by protectionism can well lose a substantial portion of profits due to this, but industrious workers have nothing to lose but their chains.
And bear in mind that to expect from an employer unleashed from competition to remain kind to the worker is naivety, pure and huge.
Monday, June 29, 2009
Illegal drugs
The one case I have heard of to keep the illegal status of some drugs is the damage on addicts.
However, so far I have never seen junkies in a rally defending the current illegal status of some drugs or fighting for further prohibition on others, say, alcohol or tobacco.
Wednesday, May 6, 2009
Freedom is daughter of the market
It is not freedom what is a necessary condition for the development of the market. Quite the opposite, is the market order what allows the birth of freedom.
Wednesday, January 21, 2009
Rules structure
A rules structure is a set of divisions of rights which formally has internal coherence.
Coercion
Coercion is not a human action against someone else's will but against some specific rules structure.
Confront this against the assertion: "Coercion occurs when one man's actions are made to serve another man's will, not for his own but for the other's purpuse" (1). If we follow this definition, I could say that anytime you undertake a service for another you are suffering coercion. If a service is being sold, it would surely be argued, then you are not suffering coercion since you are serving no another man's will but yours. But I would counter-argue: so, since due to the human action axiom you undertake any action but to serve your own will, there cannot exist coercion whatsoever.
That's why I like much more the definition of coercion "as the invasive use of physical violence or the threat thereof against someone else's person or (just) property" (2).
(1) Hayek, Friedrich. The Constitution of Liberty. 1960 -paperback edition, 1978-. Page 133.
Tuesday, January 13, 2009
What is conservatism to me
This post is about definition. Therefore, in the core it can't be judged as right or wrong from a scientific view point although it can be assessed from a logic perspective, especially in order to analyze its utility. Agreeing with its assertions only could ultimately achieve a convention but not, per se, to find the truth.
In his essay Why I am not a Conservative, Friedrich Hayek supplies reasons for not to regard himself as a conservative. This way, he was attempting to refute the perception which many had about him. Nevertheless, even after the publication of the essay in 1960, conservatives as conspicuous as Robert Nisbet continued considering him a conservative. There are reasons for this: Hayek was a declared foe of coercion; this is: of changing the distribution of rights. (As a matter of anecdote, I became a conservative thanks to Hayek.)
Conservatism of rights can collide with the fundamental classical liberal dogma of freedom only in a society allowing for legal slavery. In that unique scenario, the liberal would fight for changing the distribution of rights while a coherent conservative would defend the current distribution of rights.
What does a conservative conserve
There are several kinds of conservatism because there are several issues which may be desired to conserve. Two main kinds of conservatism are norms conservatism and moral conservatism.
A norms conservative pursues to conserve rights (or being redundant: property rights). Obviously, the existence of such rights has to have a refference to a concrete rules structure.
A moral conservative wants to conserve moral values: specific uses of freedom (i.e. property on oneself) and after all advices on how not to use freedom which transgression does not imply coercion (this is: violation of another's property). It is important to take into account, nevertheless, that to a norms conservative this conservation only can be done through moral means and not through coercion.
Conservatism as political ideology
Conservatism is an political ideology (an ideology which can be used by, say, a political party in order to guide its program) consisting in defending rights legitimately established in a concrete rules structure.
In the parliament, the conservative congressman radically defends the current rules structure and fiercely attacks bills looking for changing the rights frontiers but only fixing new frontiers where there were not. The conservative congressman typically proposes few laws and makes a lot of political control. In particular, this person never will propose a bill to re-distribute rights and will always analyze carefully bills which he presents to discard such re-distributions. Bills developed by him will pursue sanctioning and clarifying frontiers already draft.
In the executive branch, the conservative administration follows a tame obedience to the parliament. If it offers a bill will be exclusively to fine tune the State management.
The judiciary is called to be the most conservative of all political powers.
In his essay Why I am not a Conservative, Friedrich Hayek supplies reasons for not to regard himself as a conservative. This way, he was attempting to refute the perception which many had about him. Nevertheless, even after the publication of the essay in 1960, conservatives as conspicuous as Robert Nisbet continued considering him a conservative. There are reasons for this: Hayek was a declared foe of coercion; this is: of changing the distribution of rights. (As a matter of anecdote, I became a conservative thanks to Hayek.)
Conservatism of rights can collide with the fundamental classical liberal dogma of freedom only in a society allowing for legal slavery. In that unique scenario, the liberal would fight for changing the distribution of rights while a coherent conservative would defend the current distribution of rights.
What does a conservative conserve
There are several kinds of conservatism because there are several issues which may be desired to conserve. Two main kinds of conservatism are norms conservatism and moral conservatism.
A norms conservative pursues to conserve rights (or being redundant: property rights). Obviously, the existence of such rights has to have a refference to a concrete rules structure.
A moral conservative wants to conserve moral values: specific uses of freedom (i.e. property on oneself) and after all advices on how not to use freedom which transgression does not imply coercion (this is: violation of another's property). It is important to take into account, nevertheless, that to a norms conservative this conservation only can be done through moral means and not through coercion.
Conservatism as political ideology
Conservatism is an political ideology (an ideology which can be used by, say, a political party in order to guide its program) consisting in defending rights legitimately established in a concrete rules structure.
In the parliament, the conservative congressman radically defends the current rules structure and fiercely attacks bills looking for changing the rights frontiers but only fixing new frontiers where there were not. The conservative congressman typically proposes few laws and makes a lot of political control. In particular, this person never will propose a bill to re-distribute rights and will always analyze carefully bills which he presents to discard such re-distributions. Bills developed by him will pursue sanctioning and clarifying frontiers already draft.
In the executive branch, the conservative administration follows a tame obedience to the parliament. If it offers a bill will be exclusively to fine tune the State management.
The judiciary is called to be the most conservative of all political powers.
Tuesday, December 23, 2008
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